In ‘Is ethical naturalism more plausible than Supernaturalism’, I criticised Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s objection that a divine command theory (DCT) makes morality arbitrary. Armstrong argued:
Let’s assume that God commanded us not to rape. Did God have any reason to command this? If not, his command was arbitrary, and then it can’t make anything morally wrong. On the other hand, if God did have a reason to command us not to rape, then that reason is what makes rape morally wrong. The command itself is superfluous. Either way, morality cannot Image may be NSFW.
Clik here to view.depend on God’s commands.[1]
This argument can be summarized as follows:
[1] Either: (i) there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape; or, (ii) there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape.
[2] If there is no reason, r, why God prohibits rape, then God’s commands are arbitrary.
[3] If there is a reason, r, why God prohibits rape then, r, is what makes rape morally wrong.
[4] If r is what makes rape morally wrong then God’s commands are superfluous.
In response, I argued this argument commits the fallacy of equivocation because the word “makes” in premise [3] and [4] is ambiguous. I noted the word “makes” can be used in at least two different senses.
One sense refers to constitutive explanations, such as when one affirms that what makes a cup of clear liquid a cup of water is that fact the liquid is H20. The second refers to a motivational explanation, as in, when I state that my love for my children makes me persevere in parenting. If the word makes is used in the constitutive sense, [4] is true but [3] is false. If it’s used in a motivational sense [3] is true but [4] is false. Either way the argument fails.
1 Armstrong’s Dilemma
In a footnote, Carrier dismisses this response as “hand waving” and “completely off point”:”When Armstrong says “reason [r] is what makes rape morally wrong” he simply means “r is the reason rape is morally wrong.” Thus “r is what makes rape morally wrong” simply means “rape is morally wrong when r.”[2]
There are two problems with this response.
First, Carrier’s assertion that Armstrong “simply means ‘r is the reason rape is morally wrong’” is not supported by the text. Two pages earlier, Armstrong explicitly states he intends the phrase “what makes it morally wrong to rape is that God commands it” to be synonymous with “a divine command constitutes our moral duty not to rape”[3] suggesting he adopts the constitutive sense I criticize in my paper. Carrier is of course free to disagree with Armstrong’s objection. But he shouldn’t pretend he said something other than what he did.
Second, even if Carrier’s interpretation were correct, the equivocation still remains. The phrase “rape is morally wrong when r” is ambiguous in exactly the same way. There are different ways rape can be “morally wrong when r”. One reason “rape is morally wrong when r” could be that the r constitutes the wrongness of rape. Another reason could be that r provides a motivational reason for the wrongness of rape. The same points I made in my article, therefore apply to this reworking of Armstrong’s argument.
Apart from boldly asserting I am “off base” and “hand waving” all Carrier does here is repeat the same argument Armstrong made with the same problem.
Interestingly, in the main text of the article, Carrier offers a different response. He states:
Flannagan fails to address the point raised, which is that either there is a moral ground for the commands God makes or there is not, and if there is, it will remain that ground without DCT, therefore DCT is not needed; whereas if there is not, then God’s commands have no moral ground.[4]
However, all Carrier does here is repeat the argument [1] [2] [3] [4] above, replacing the word “reason” with the word “moral ground”. Given that I spent three pages of my article addressing this dilemma, and given Carrier mentions my response and replies to it in a footnote, it’s odd he states in the main text that I never addressed it.
And changing the word “reason” to “moral ground” doesn’t remove the fallacy either. This time the ambiguity involves the word “moral ground”.
If by moral ground, he means the existence of some antecedent moral requirement for God to command as he does, then the divine command theorist will deny that God has a moral ground for his commands, seeing moral requirements just are divine commands there are no moral obligations prior to God’s commanding. The problem for Carrier is that construed this way it doesn’t follow that his commands are arbitrary. To be arbitrary God would have to lack any reason for his commands. But the fact one is not obligated to do something does not mean one has no reason at all to do it. Carrier here conflates lacking a reason for doing something with lacking a moral obligation to do it.
Perhaps Carrier will protest that the phrase “moral ground” refers to something other than an antecedent moral requirement. But if this is the case his inference: “if there is, [a moral ground] it will remain that ground without DCT, therefore DCT is not needed” is invalid. The fact one can explain why an action has some feature other than being morally required antecedent to God’s commands, does not entail that God’s commands aren’t needed to explain the feature of being morally required.
2. Morally Indifferent God
Carrier’s second attempt to rescue the arbitrariness objection is that: “Since it is logically possible for God to be evil or indifferent or morally alien to human values, it cannot be arbitrarily assumed that what God says is in fact best for us.”[5]
This again however fails to pay attention to what I wrote. On the first page of my paper I explicated the contention I was defending as follows:
Craig’s contention is that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, …By “God” Craig means a necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe.[emphasis mine]
Carrier himself in fact quotes selectively from this paragraph when he erroneously accuses me of a circular argument. He states “Flannagan’s thesis imagines that, in effect, if God is a ‘necessarily existent, all-powerful, all-knowing, loving and just, immaterial person who created and providentially orders the universe,’ then what he concludes is morally right would indeed be morally right.” [emphasis mine] [6]
Consequently, given how terms have been defined it’s not logically possible for God to be evil or indifferent or morally alien to human values. His argument is sound only if he chooses to define the word God in way different to the way I specifically defined the term for the purpose of argument, and contrary to the way he stated I had defined the term only a few paragraphs earlier. Again Carrier seems determined to respond to caricatures he has chosen to construct rather than my article.
3. Independent motivation
Next Carrier appeals to the fact we can be motivated to do certain actions independently of any beliefs we have about God.
Why are commands resulting from a concern for the welfare of others “moral” commands? Why should we heed them? Really, only if we ourselves care about the welfare of others. Which is an appeal to a fact independent of God. Which will be sufficiently motivating for us with- out a god. Therefore DCT cannot ground morality, except in the arbitrary fact of what some god likes.[7]
This again attacks something other than a DCT, because, as I noted in my previous post, and is evident from the citation of my contention above, I was defending the claim that if theism is true then we can plausibly explain the nature of moral obligation by identifying obligations with God’s commands, analogous to the way “we explain the nature of water by identifying it with H2O, or explain the nature of heat by identifying it with molecular motion.”
Here I explicitly specified the kind of grounding relationship I was defending was one of informative identity: it’s the same kind of relationship that H20 has to water. My conditional does not affirm a thesis about moral motivation. It doesn’t claim we are motivated to do what is right by God’s say so. To point out therefore that we can be motivated by facts other than the fact that God commanded the action does not address my contention at all. It again changes the subject.
Carrier’s argument here would only be of relevance if we affirmed something like the following premise:
If a person can be motivated to do P without appealing to Q then P is not identical to Q.
This thesis is however false. I gave a counter example in my paper: my son Noah can be motivated to drink water because he is thirsty, and he can appeal to his thirst as a reason to drink quite independently of any beliefs he has about hydrogen or oxygen. It doesn’t follow from this that water is not identical with H20. Given I made this distinction in the paper it is odd Carrier ignores it.
- Carrier’s Special Pleading
Carrier’s defence therefore lacks cogency. Before concluding however it’s worth noting his position is prima facie incoherent. On p 208 he claims he has thoroughly demonstrated that:
“S morally ought to do A” means “If S’s desires were rationally deduced from as many facts as S can reasonably obtain at that time (about S’s preferences and the outcomes of S’s available alternatives in S’s circumstances), then S would prefer A over all the available alternative courses of action (at that time and in those circumstances).”15
Carrier here defines the concept of “moral requirement” in terms of what a person would desire to do if they were deliberating correctly and sufficiently informed. This however raises an obvious question, one I actually raised in the paper, if identifying moral obligations with the commands of God who is fully informed (omniscient) and rational, makes moral requirements arbitrary. Why does identifying the concept of the obligatory with what we would prefer if we were sufficiently informed and rational not also make morality arbitrary?
Let S+ refer to S when his desires are rationally deduced from as many facts as S can reasonably obtain at that time. The same objection Armstrong raised against a DCT can be raised against Carrier’s version of ethical naturalism. Consider the following analogue of Armstrong’s argument.
[1] Either: (i) there is a reason, r, why S+ hates rape; or, (ii) there is no reason, r, why S+ prohibits rape.
[2] If there is no reason, r, why S+ hates rape, then S+’s commands are arbitrary.
[3] If there is a reason, r, why S+ hates rape then, r, is what makes rape morally wrong.
[4] If r is what makes rape morally wrong then S+’s desires are superfluous.
If [1]-[4] is a sound objection to DCT, [1]’-[4]’ is a sound objection to Carrier’s own ethical naturalism. Carrier apparently thinks that the preferences of a person who is sufficiently informed and rational are not arbitrary or whimsical, because that person is informed and rational. However, he simultaneously thinks that the commands of a person who is omniscient and rational must be arbitrary and whimsical. This makes very little sense. The only thing arbitrary here is Carrier’s own special pleading.
[1]Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” In Is Goodness without God Good Enough: A Debate on Faith, Secularism and Ethics eds. Robert K Garcia and Nathan L King (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), p. 108.
[2] Richard Carrier” Richard Carrier, “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there is: A Reply to Matthew Flannagan” Philo 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2012), 211.
[3] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Why Traditional Theism Cannot Provide an Adequate Foundation for Morality” 106.
[4] Richard Carrier “On the Facts as we Know them, Ethical Naturalism is all there” 204
[5]Ibid, 204
[6] Ibid, 202
[7] Ibid, 204